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I. Introduction
TV as we know it is changing, but the courts and Congress
again face the issue of how copyright law should adapt.1 As cable
providers and broadcast networks battle over retransmission fees
and the cost of cable TV increases, Internet TV becomes more
1. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3393 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-461)
(deciding whether Aereo’s service retransmitting broadcast TV over the Internet
infringes broadcasters’ copyrights). See generally WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS
AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009) [hereinafter PATRY, MORAL PANICS] (discussing
various copyright wars in recent history).
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popular.2 Cable providers try to compete in the Internet TV
market by offering live and on-demand programming accessible
over the Internet but struggle to compete with the variety of
online video delivery.3 Some companies, such as Sony, Google,
and Amazon, considered plans for Internet TV that would be
similar to cable TV.4 However, two companies, Aereo and
FilmOn, began offering broadcast TV over the Internet in 2012.5
As viewers abandon cable TV for Internet programming,
broadcast companies must fight to find profits through existing
copyright law.6 Broadcasters won a monumental battle against
Aereo in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,7 which forced
the company to suspend its service.8 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York found FilmOn in contempt of
2. See, e.g., Michael Calabrese, The CBS-Time Warner Cable Blackout
Battle: Time for Congress to Rescue the Hostages, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2013, 4:58 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/08/09/cbs_time_warner_cable_blac
kout_battle_congress_should_rescue_hostages.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014)
(reporting on the battle over retransmission fees between Time Warner Cable
and CBS and discussing the increase in younger people “cut[ting] the cord”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Watch Online, XFINITY, http://xfinitytv.comcast.net/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2014) (offering live TV and already-aired shows for viewers) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Calabrese, supra note 2
(“[B]roadcasters are threatened by a different type of online video delivery.”).
4. See Amol Sharma, Shalini Ramachandran & Don Clark, Amazon
Considering Online Pay-TV Service, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304757004579334981130
200324?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (reporting
that Amazon, Sony, Google, and Intel are working on technology for a pay-TV
service) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See About Aereo, AEREO, http://aereo.com/about (last visited Mar. 30,
2014) (explaining the Internet TV service Aereo offers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Online Media Solutions, FILMON,
http://corp.filmon.com/#web_solutions (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (describing the
on-demand and live-TV services offered) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
6. See Calabrese, supra note 2 (arguing for congressional action to prevent
the blackouts that the fee battles cause).
7. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
8. See id. at 2503 (finding that Aereo infringes on broadcasters’ exclusive
public performance rights in violation of the 1986 Copyright Act). Prior to
issuing its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected FilmOn’s motion to intervene,
and thus the Court’s decision discusses only Aereo. See Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 2014 WL 801080, at *1 (No. 13-461) (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) (denying
FilmOn’s motion for leave to intervene).
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court for attempting to offer Boston broadcasts,9 and after a brief
stint offering local channels for a fee, FilmOn ceased offering any
live local broadcast channels.10
Aereo and FilmOn did not license shows or pay
retransmission fees.11 Aereo and FilmOn captured airwave
broadcasts through antennas, copied the data, and transmitted it
to customers via the Internet.12 Broadcasters did not profit from
Aereo and FilmOn’s services as they do from cable companies,
and as a result, broadcasters filed claims for copyright
infringement in several district courts.13 The Second Circuit is
the only court of appeals that issued an opinion and ruled in
favor of Aereo based on Second Circuit precedent interpreting the
Copyright Act provisions at issue.14 The Supreme Court, however,
overturned the Second Circuit without even mentioning the
precedent the Second Circuit relied on, finding that Aereo
operated too much like a cable system.15 Aereo and FilmOn’s next
approach argued that they are cable companies and thus entitled

9. See CBS Broad. Inc. v. Filmon.com, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7532(NRB), 2014
WL 3702568, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (“[W]e find FilmOn in civil contempt
of court for its violation of the Injunction.”).
10. See Live TV, FILMON, http://www.filmon.com/group/ (last visited Oct.
31, 2014) (failing to list any local channels) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Jeff John Roberts, FilmOn Launches “Teleport” Technology to
Stream TV in 18 Cities, Improve on Aereo, GIGAOM (June 30, 2014, 11:55 AM),
http://gigaom.com/2014/06/30/filmon-launches-teleport-technology-to-stream-tvin-18-cities-improve-on-aereo/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (discussing FilmOn’s
new requirement of paying for local broadcast channels) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Supreme Court Will Hear Broadcasters’ Appeal Against Online TV
Service
Aereo,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
10,
2014,
5:06
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/10/aereo-supreme-court-broadcastersappeal-online-tv (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (reporting that Aereo and FilmOn
“do not pay broadcasters”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See id. (explaining Aereo and FilmOn’s technology and service).
13. See id. (discussing broadcasters’ claims).
14. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir.
2013) (ruling in favor of Aereo).
15. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2501 (2014)
(“[T]hese behind-the-scenes technological differences do not distinguish Aereo’s
system from cable systems, which do perform publicly.”); see generally id.
(lacking any mention of the Second Circuit’s reasoning).
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to compulsory licensing under the same Act the Supreme Court
found Aereo to violate.16
As technology changes, intellectual property law must
change with it, but the law cannot grow as quickly as
technology.17 The U.S. Constitution specifically gives Congress
the power to protect, “for limited times,” creators’ exclusive rights
to their “writings and discoveries.”18 Copyright law intends to
grow and spur technology and innovation.19 As powerful
industries lobby Congress,20 the original intent of copyright law
has arguably lost its meaning.21 U.S. copyright law faced many
“Copyright Wars,”22 and this Note explores the latest Copyright
War over Internet broadcast TV.
This Note examines whether a service that uses the Internet
to allow users to watch live broadcast TV infringes on
broadcasters’ exclusive “public performance right.” The Supreme
Court correctly found that such technology violates broadcasters’
public performance rights under the 1976 Copyright Act23 despite
Second Circuit precedent. Additionally, this Note considers
16. See Keach Hagey, Aereo’s Bid for Comeback Hinges on Cable License,
WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2014, 6:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/aereos-bidfor-comeback-hinges-on-cable-license-1405032643 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (“If
it were classified as a cable company, Aereo argues, it should be able to qualify
for a ‘compulsory license’ . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
17. See Cullen Kiker, Amazon Cloud Player: The Latest Front in the
Copyright Cold War, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 235, 288 (2012) (“[B]ut the
problem . . . is that technology grows exponentially while the law grows
arithmetically.”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See id. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”); PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 39
(“It is innovation that leads to progress and to new learning—the only goals of
copyright.”).
20. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 121 (Rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY] (discussing the motion picture industry’s lobbying efforts
after VCRs entered the market).
21. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 39 (arguing that the
Copyright Wars reflect a move away from innovation and learning as a purpose
of copyright law).
22. Id. at xviii–xix.
23. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2012)).
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whether a finding of infringement for Aereo and FilmOn aligns
with the purpose of copyright law and argues that the evolution
of copyright law in the United States no longer reflects the
original intentions of copyright law.
Part II explains Aereo and FilmOn’s technology. Part III
outlines the legal background necessary for understanding the
copyright issues surrounding the Aereo and FilmOn technology.
Part IV explains the various cases against Aereo and FilmOn.
Part V analyzes whether Aereo and FilmOn violate broadcasters’
public performance rights and applies the Second Circuit’s
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision)24
analysis to FilmOn to demonstrate how minute differences in
technology can lead to different results in copyright law. Part V
concludes that despite the 1976 Copyright Act, Aereo and FilmOn
should be considered noninfringing because of the history and
purpose of copyright.
II. Explaining the Technology at Issue
A. Aereo’s Technology
Aereo’s users received and recorded broadcast TV from a
computer or mobile device via the Internet.25 Aereo advertised
itself as a TV antenna, but instead of a traditional antenna
attached to one’s TV, Aereo’s antenna was in “the cloud.”26
Aereo assigned one antenna per user, even if two users
requested to watch the same show at the same time.27 Physically,
each antenna looked like two metal loops, about the size of a
dime.28 Eighty antennas filled one end of a circuit board, and
24. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
25. About Aereo, supra note 5.
26. Id. The term “the cloud” describes any computing services, including
networks, servers, and storage, done from a remote location. See Nicole D. Galli
& Edward Gecovich, Cloud Computing and the Doctrine of Joint Infringement:
“Current Impact” and Future Possibilities, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
673, 674, 676 (2012) (discussing cloud computing).
27. U.S. Patent No. 20,120,127,363 (filed May 24, 2012); see also WNET,
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 682 (2d Cir. 2013) (“No two
users share the same antenna at the same time . . . .”).
28. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), aff’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir.
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electronic components that process the broadcast signals occupied
the rest of the circuit board.29 To achieve a high antenna density
to receive the most broadcasts, sixteen circuit boards existed
within a metal housing.30 Despite the high antenna density,
Aereo claimed that the antennas functioned independently.31
An antenna optimization and control system received
requests from users and assigned an antenna to obtain the user’s
desired content.32 If there were no available antennas, the
optimization and control system sent a busy signal back to the
user.33 For each antenna, a corresponding tuner captured the
broadcast signal.34 The tuner transmitted the broadcast to an
encoding system that decoded the transmission into video and
audio formats.35 Then, a multiplexer put the content into an
efficient format for streaming and storage.36 Regardless of
whether the user requested to watch the program immediately or
in the future, the system stored the user-unique data in a
broadcast file.37 If a user chose to watch a program live, the
streaming server buffered and streamed the broadcast content to
the user’s device with a six- or seven-second delay.38 If the user
wanted to record the program for later viewing, the system kept
the copy in the user’s broadcast file until the user chose to delete
the copy.39

2013).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 381.
’363 Patent, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Aereo User’s Experience

The background technology may be complicated, but the
user’s experience was simple.40 To subscribe to Aereo’s service,
the user must have been a resident of a subscription area where
Aereo offers service.41 To watch broadcast TV through Aereo, the
user must have been within the user’s “home coverage area.”42
The channels available to the user depended on the user’s home
coverage area but included many public access channels, such as
PBS, as well as the major broadcasting networks CBS, NBC,
ABC, and FOX.43 Aereo limited its service to cities where it had
antennas.44 Therefore, users could only view channels that they
could watch via an antenna connected to their TV.45
When a user logged onto Aereo’s website, the website
displayed programs currently airing or that would air in the
future, and the user could choose to watch or record.46 When the
user selected to watch a program currently airing, the user could
pause and rewind the program to the time the user began
watching that program.47 If the user chose to record a program
40. About Aereo, supra note 5.
41. Frequently Asked Questions, AEREO, http://aereo.com/faqs (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Note that
Aereo bases a user’s residence on that user’s billing address. Id.
42. Id.; see also ’363 Patent, supra note 27 (explaining that the server uses
the user’s Internet Protocol address to get the user’s geographical location).
43. TV Channels, AEREO, http://aereo.com/channels (last visited May 7,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. Where Can I Get Aereo?, AEREO, http://aereo.com/coverage (last visited
Mar. 29, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Aereo transmits to its subscribers broadcast television programs . . . .”);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994) (“Broadcast stations
radiate electromagnetic signals from a central transmitting antenna. These
signals can be captured, in turn, by any television set within the antenna’s
range.”); Matthew Moskovciak, TV Without Cable: How to Cut the Cord, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_16257225739/tv-without-cable-how-to-cut-the-cord/ (last updated Apr. 28, 2011,
12:20 PM) (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (“Many people are shocked when they find
out they can receive free high definition TV from major TV networks simply by
connecting a basic over-the-air antenna.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
46. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 681.
47. Id. at 681 & n.3.
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airing in the future, Aereo recorded the program to the user’s
unique broadcast file for later viewing.48
C. Differences Between Aereo and FilmOn
FilmOn and Aereo operated in the same basic way with
“minor distinctions in the sequence in which signals were
processed.”49 At one point, Aereo offered its services in eleven
cities including New York City, Boston, and Salt Lake City.50
FilmOn’s availability extended to fourteen cities including New
York City, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Seattle.51
Although originally the services’ pay schemes differed, Aereo
and FilmOn mainly differed in their geographic accessibility.52
FilmOn advertised that users could watch TV from anywhere in
the world,53 but in the terms and conditions of service, users
agreed to watch only the services “in the area in which the
broadcast was intended to be viewed.”54 If a New York City user,
however, traveled to Los Angeles, nothing stopped the New York
user from accessing New York channels while in Los Angeles. 55
48. Id. at 681.
49. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC (FilmOn X), No. 13-758,
2013 WL 4763414, at *2 n.4 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013). The plaintiffs against
FilmOn claimed that FilmOn’s system is missing a number of elements that
Aereo has, but the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
noted that it could not determine what elements were missing, and it did not
affect the copyright analysis. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller
Content Sys. (BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1141 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
50. TV Channels, supra note 43.
51. Support, FILMON, http://support.111pix.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase
/Article/View/38/9/in-which-us-cities-does-filmon-have-local-channels (last
visited Oct. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Aside
from basic area channels, FilmOn also boasts over 500 live TV channels that
FilmOn licenses from broadcasters, as well as 45,000 Video On Demand movies
and shows. Declaration of Alkiviades David at 5–6, FilmOn X, 2013 WL 4763414
(D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2013) (No. 13-758).
52. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 41 (listing Aereo’s cost to
users
as
$8
per
month);
Terms
&
Conditions,
FILMON,
http://www.filmon.com/page/terms-en (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (describing
FilmOn’s service as free) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. What We Do, FILMON, http://corp.filmon.com/#tv_solutions (last visited
Oct. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. Terms & Conditions, supra note 52.
55. See Telephone Interview with Alkiviades David, CEO, FilmOn (Jan. 21,
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Aereo, on the other hand, delivered only the channels of the
user’s geographic location based on billing and Internet Protocol
addresses.56 Courts deemed Aereo and FilmOn as technologically
the same,57 but the accessibility distinction could have caused a
different result under the Second Circuit’s analysis.58
III. Relevant Legal Background of Copyright Law
A. 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Copyright Act governs the legal issues Aereo and
FilmOn faced.59 The 1976 Copyright Act outlines several
exclusive rights of copyright holders.60 For motion pictures and
audiovisual works, copyright holders possess the exclusive right
“to perform . . . [or] display the copyrighted work publicly.”61 The
1976 Act defines performance of a copyrighted work as “to recite,
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any
devise or process.”62 The transmit clause defines “to perform
publicly” as “to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance or display of the work to a [public place] or to the
public, by means of any device or process.”63 Without a public
performance or display, there is not necessarily a copyright
2014) (saying that someone on the East Coast could watch West Coast TV) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (describing Aereo’s user
requirement to be located in and a resident of the area where the user logs in to
watch local channels).
57. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC (FilmOn X), No. 13758, 2013 WL 4763414, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (deeming FilmOn’s
technology as “‘similar . . . in every relevant way’ to the technology at issue in
Aereo” (citation omitted)).
58. See infra Part V.B (arguing that FilmOn and Aereo should receive
different outcomes on whether they violate copyright law).
59. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 684 (2d Cir.
2013) (citing the 1976 Copyright Act’s exclusive rights and exceptions); FilmOn
X, 2013 WL 4763414, at *1 (framing the issue in terms of the law in the 1976
Copyright Act).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6) (2012) (outlining “exclusive rights in
copyrighted works”).
61. Id. § 106(4)–(5).
62. Id. § 101.
63. Id.
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infringement.64 Thus, violation of a copyright holder’s public
performance right requires two elements: (1) a performance or
display and (2) a transmission to the public, including one as
defined by the transmit clause.65
The 1976 Act also provides exceptions to the exclusive rights
of copyright holders.66 Fair use is one of the most common
exceptions.67 Historically, fair use prevented copyright holders
from demanding royalties when someone, like a reviewer, quoted
the work.68 In the United States, judges employed fair use to
ensure copyright law pursued its public policy purpose of
promoting art and science.69 The 1976 Act codified fair use for the
first time,70 but its codification did not alter the doctrine.71 The
statute does not explicitly define fair use, but it provides four
factors to analyze in considering whether a use of work qualifies
as fair use.72 The four factors are (1) “the purpose and character
of the use;” (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work;” (3) the
amount of the work used; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”73
64. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 105–07
(discussing whether private copying is a copyright infringement).
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (5) (outlining the exclusive rights for copyright
holders of motion pictures); id. § 101 (defining public performance and
transmission).
66. See id. §§ 107–12 (defining the limitations on exclusive rights,
including fair use).
67. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 15–16
(describing fair use as one of the “safety valves” of copyright law that keep it
from being an absolute monopoly like patents); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying
fair use).
68. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12A.06[B][1] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2013) (discussing the history of fair
use).
69. See 4 id. § 13.05 (discussing the defense of fair use); GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing the importance of fair
use to ensure that copyright is not a monopoly).
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (outlining fair use as an exclusion to the exclusive
rights); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.05 (“The Copyright Act of 1976
for the first time accorded express statutory recognition of this judge-made rule
of reason.”).
71. See id. (noting that Congress did not intend to alter the fair use
doctrine).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The 1976 Act also includes the first sale doctrine, another
long-time judicially applied limit on copyright.74 The first sale
doctrine gives copyright holders the right to control the first sale
or disposition of a copy, but does not permit copyright holders to
restrict or control the resale or transfer of the copy.75
One of the major changes to the 1976 Act from its
predecessor, the 1909 Act,76 was the addition of § 111.77 Section
111 creates a compulsory license for cable companies’
retransmission of broadcast TV.78 Cable companies can
retransmit local broadcasts without permission from the
broadcasters so long as cable companies pay royalties to the
broadcasters.79 While some stakeholders argue that § 111 is
broad enough to encompass services like Aereo and FilmOn,80 the
Copyright Office does not agree and has opposed creating a
compulsory licensing scheme for such services.81
74. See id. § 8.12[B][1] (discussing the history of the first sale doctrine).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (outlining the limit on the exclusive
distribution right after the first sale of a work).
76. Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), repealed and superseded by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2012)).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 111.
78. See id. § 111(c), (d) (creating a compulsory licensing scheme for cable
providers); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.18[E] (discussing Congress’s
decision to include a compulsory licensing scheme for cable companies who were
previously free of copyright liability under the 1909 Act).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), (d) (providing “statutory licensing” for cable
companies as long as they abide by the royalty fees outlined in subsection d).
80. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND
LOCALISM ACT § 302 REPORT 45 (Aug. 29, 2011) (“One stakeholder, ivi, Inc.,
argued that the language of Section 111 is broad enough to permit an online
video provider, like itself, to stream live broadcast signals over the internet.”).
81. See id. at 48 (“The Office itself opposed (and continues to oppose) the
formation of a statutory license for the retransmission of broadcast signals over
the Internet.”). A discussion of whether services like Aereo and FilmOn are
subject to the § 111 compulsory licensing scheme is beyond the scope of this
Note. Aereo’s latest legal tactic, however, argues that under the Supreme
Court’s decision, it should be considered a cable company eligible for compulsory
licensing. See Joint Letter at 2, Aereo, Inc. v. CBS Broad. Inc., No. 1:13-cv-3013AJN (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014) (outlining Aereo’s position that it should be
considered a cable company subject to compulsory licensing). Aereo also
petitioned the FCC to change the definition of “a provider of video services” to
enable Aereo to resume operations. Alex Barinka, Aereo Asks FCC to Change
Definition
of
Video
Distributor,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
13,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-13/aereo-asks-fcc-to-change-definition-
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B. History and Precedent of the Public Performance Right
Before 1976
At the heart of copyright law are “conflicting cultural,
economic, and political values.”82 Copyright is supposed to
cultivate art and literature, protect free markets, and promote
free speech.83 Many scholars make a utilitarian argument for the
origins of copyright by asserting that without copyright
protection, authors, inventors, and composers would have no
incentives to create works and distribute them to the public. 84
Scholar William Patry, however, points out the limits of this
argument in the context of U.S. copyright law where the law
affords protections for works that do not need incentives like
letters, business documents, and speeches.85
States enacted the original copyright law in the United
States, but the Framers recognized the discrepancies among state
laws and urged for national copyright law during the
Constitutional Convention.86 The issue of public performance
rights arose in the context of music with an amendment to the
1870 Copyright Act.87 When Congress wrote the 1909 Copyright
Act, it included the public performance right with the caveat that
the public performance be “for profit.”88
of-video-distributor.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
82. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 30.
83. See id. (discussing the purpose of copyright).
84. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 62 (“The
utilitarian/consequentialist origin story is based on the assertion that only by
providing copyright protection will there be sufficient incentives for authors to
distribute their works to the public.”). The House Report on the 1909 Copyright
Act supported copyright law with this utilitarian argument. See H.R. REP. NO.
60-2222, at 10 (1909) (“[C]opyright legislation . . . is not based upon any natural
right . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and
progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”).
85. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 62 (“Among the many
difficulties with this origin story is that it is not used as a practical guide to
legislating.”).
86. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 41 (discussing
the history of U.S. copyright).
87. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481 (1897) (revising the copyright
statute to protect public performances of dramatic and musical compositions).
88. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075
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A pre-1976 copyright case, Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists,89 dealt with a somewhat similar issue as Aereo.90 In areas
of West Virginia, hilly terrain kept some people from receiving
TV-broadcasting stations.91 The defendant, Fortnightly, installed
antennas on hills above cities, connected them to coaxial cables,
strung the antennas on utility poles, and offered the service to
homes that could not receive a signal otherwise.92 The plaintiffs
argued that Fortnightly’s system infringed the broadcasters’
exclusive public performance rights.93 In finding for Fortnightly,
the Supreme Court drew a distinction between types of
performances.94 The broadcaster is an “active performer,” while
the viewer is a “passive beneficiary.”95 Under this framework, the
Court concluded that Fortnightly’s system “falls on the viewer’s
side of the line”96 because the system essentially did something
that the individual could legally do himself by attaching an
antenna to his TV.97
Six years after Fortnightly, but two years before the 1976
Copyright Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fortnightly
decision in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.98 Similar to the defendants in Fortnightly, Teleprompter
(1909) (“To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit . . . .”), repealed and
superseded by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2012)).
89. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
90. See id. at 391–92 (explaining Fortnightly’s system). Aereo dealt with a
similar issue of using antennas not attached to users’ TVs to watch broadcast
TV. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680–82 (2d Cir. 2013)
(explaining Aereo’s antenna technology).
91. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 391–92.
92. See id. at 392 (explaining Fortnightly’s system).
93. See id. at 394 (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument for infringement
under the 1909 Copyright Act).
94. See id. at 398 (discussing the differences between types of audiences for
different types of performances).
95. Id. at 399.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 400 (“If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a
cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would
not be ‘performing’ the programs he received . . . . The only difference . . . is that
the antenna system is erected and owned not by its users but by an
entrepreneur.”).
98. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394,
409–10 (1974) (applying Fortnightly to the facts and noting that the Court of
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captured local broadcasts and transmitted them to homes.99
Teleprompter’s transmissions extended to people who would
ordinarily be unable to receive the broadcasts due to the far
distance between the viewer and broadcast station.100 Thus,
Teleprompter’s service went beyond what Fortnightly offered.101
Again considering the viewer–performer line, the Supreme Court
found that receiving and rechanneling broadcast signals was a
viewer function because Teleprompter did not change the
programming, and the signals were for simultaneous viewing.102
When broadcast companies send out electronic signals to the
public, they permit any member of the public with the means to
receive the signal to convert the signals into sights and sounds. 103
Thus, the combination of Telepromter’s viewer function and
public access of broadcast TV made the performance
noninfringing.104
Teleprompter made an important comparison between the TV
industry copyright protections and other copyrighted material,
such as books.105 The sale of books requires the seller to profit
from the consumer.106 But with TV, consumers do not directly pay
the copyright holder—the broadcast companies—because
advertisers pay the broadcasting companies to advertise during
the broadcast programming.107 Therefore, viewers have no “direct
economic relationship with the copyright holders or their
Appeals “misconceived the thrust of this Court’s opinion in Fortnightly”).
99. Id. at 399–400.
100. Id. at 400.
101. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
391–92 (1968) (discussing Fortnightly’s technology and purpose).
102. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408 (“[Teleprompter] does not, for
copyright purposes, alter the function it performs for its subscribers. . . . The
reception and rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is
essentially a viewer function . . . .”).
103. See id. (“When a television broadcaster transmits a program, it has
made public for simultaneous viewing and hearing the contents of that
program.”).
104. See id. at 414 (finding for Teleprompter).
105. See id. at 411 (comparing the TV industry to books).
106. See id. (noting that the profit scheme for TV is markedly different from
that of other copyrighted material).
107. See id. (“[H]olders of copyrights for television programs or their
licensees are not paid directly by those who ultimately enjoy the publication of
the material . . . .”).
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licensees.”108 This distinguishing factor between TV and other
types of copyrightable material led the Court to conclude that
“CATV systems . . . do not interfere in any traditional sense with
the copyright holders’ means of extracting recompense for their
creativity or labor.”109 A few years later, however, the 1976
Copyright Act superseded Fortnightly and Teleprompter.110
C. Congressional Intent of the 1976 Copyright Act
As Fortnightly and Teleprompter demonstrate, cable TV
initially emerged to increase access to broadcast TV for viewers
unable to receive the broadcasts.111 Then it evolved to give
viewers access to distant broadcast signals.112 As early as 1965,
Congress held hearings regarding how to deal with the issues
over retransmission rights between cable providers and
broadcasters,113 but the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) quickly promulgated rules that froze cable retransmissions
of broadcast TV.114 In May 1966, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that cable companies publicly
performed broadcast TV under the 1909 Copyright Act.115 The
Supreme Court reversed the Southern District of New York’s
ruling in 1968,116 but the FCC retained the freeze and forged
108. Id.
109. Id. at 412.
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–90 (1976) (discussing Fortnightly and
Teleprompter and the difficult legal battles regarding cable TV and copyright
law).
111. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.18[A].
112. See id. (“[The function of] cable television became that of making
available in a given community signals from distant television stations which by
reason of distance of the stations would not otherwise be available . . . .”).
113. See 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:51 (2008)
[hereinafter PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT] (discussing the first congressional
hearings on cable in 1965).
114. See id. § 14:52 (discussing how the “FCC stepped into the debate in a
big way”).
115. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp.
177, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding Fortnightly’s CATV system infringing), rev’d,
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
116. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 390,
402 (1968) (reversing the lower court’s decision and finding noninfringement).
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ahead to create a fee and licensing scheme through regulations.117
Then in 1976, Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act to resolve
the public performance and cable TV issues with the compulsory
licensing scheme of § 111.118
The 1976 Copyright Act ensured and expanded copyright
owners’ ability to exploit their works.119 The Act abandoned the
“for profit” requirement for a public performance right violation
because Congress thought many nonprofit organizations could
afford the royalty fees.120 Abandoning the for profit requirement
to capture nonprofit uses signified the congressional intent to
expand the public performance right.121 Furthermore, the House
Report explained several key definitions demonstrating its intent
for a broad public performance right.122 The report expands the
definitions of the words “transmit” and “perform” to mean beyond
“the initial rendition or showing.”123 Transmit and perform can
also be “any further act by which that rendition or showing is
transmitted or communicated to the public.”124 The report’s
examples of performances include “a cable television system . . .
when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any
individual . . . whenever he or she . . . communicates the
performance by turning on a receiving set.”125
The report explained that performances via “any device or
process” could mean “any other techniques and systems not yet in
use or even invented.”126 In discussing the transmit clause, the
report notes that “[e]ach and every method by which the images
117. See PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 113, § 14:54 (discussing the
FCC reaction to Fortnightly).
118. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the
congressional intent behind the 1976 Act).
119. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.11[D][4][b] (“Congress sought
to hold all activities liable that would interfere with the copyright owner’s
ability to exploit the work . . . .”).
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62–63 (1976) (discussing the “performing
rights and the ‘for profit’ limitation”).
121. See id. (discussing the changes to the public performance right).
122. See id. at 63–65 (explaining several of the definitions in § 101).
123. Id. at 63.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and
conveyed is a ‘transmission.’”127 Congress emphasized its
intentions for the transmit clause to be broad and include “all
conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless
communications media.”128
Congress also intended the definition of “public” to be
expansive.129 In the House Report, Congress gave several
different scenarios of when a transmission is public, including
“whenever the potential recipients of the transmission represent
a limited segment of the public.”130 The legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act shows Congress’s intentions to incorporate
broader meanings of the rights originally outlined in the 1909 Act
and the desire to have the 1976 Act anticipate future
technological changes.131 Despite this congressional intent, public
performance cases under the 1976 Act arguably continue under
the Fortnightly and Teleprompter view of broadcasters’ limited
rights.132
D. Relevant Case Precedent Leading Up to Cablevision and Aereo
The first major public performance issue with the 1976 Act
arose with the rise of home videocassette recorders (VCRs). VCRs
became available in the United States just prior to the enactment
of the 1976 Copyright Act.133 In 1976, Universal City Studios and
Walt Disney Productions challenged the technology for copyright
infringement because VCRs could be used to record TV
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 65 (explaining the definition of public).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 63–64 (discussing Congress’s explanations for the terms in
the 1976 Act).
132. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S.
417, 426 (1984) (emphasizing user control and not discussing the revenue effect
on broadcasters).
133. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 117 (“1976
might have seemed an ideal time for the motion picture companies to ask
Congress to add some form of liability for home videotaping . . . [because] [h]ome
videocassette recorders had been introduced into the American market only the
year before.”).
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broadcasts.134 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California found no copyright infringement based on a
consideration of practical implications and the principle that a
copyright is not a monopoly.135 While acknowledging the
plaintiffs’ concerns about new technology, the district court
dismissed plaintiffs’ fears by citing radio’s fears that TV would
destroy radio, which TV did not do.136
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America137 with “unusual speed,”138
perhaps recognizing the time sensitivity of the case because VCR
sales grew quickly.139 The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
unanimously agreed that the district court read Congress’s
intentions of the 1976 Copyright Act incorrectly.140 Members of
Congress quickly introduced bills in the House and Senate to
overturn the Ninth Circuit decision.141 Motion picture companies
intensely lobbied Congress in opposition of these bills, but
lobbying on both sides slowed when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in June 1982.142

134. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,
435–36 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (discussing the technological capabilities of “Video Tape
Recorders”), rev’d, 659 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
135. See id. at 469 (“Nor did the testimony invoke concern that denial of
monopoly power over home-use recording would significantly dissuade authors
and producers from creating audiovisual material for television.”).
136. See id. (“[T]his court does not minimize plaintiffs’ concerns. . . . History,
however, shows that this fear may be misplaced.”).
137. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
138. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 120.
139. See id. (“In 1979, when Judge Ferguson issued his decision, VCR
producers had sold 475,000 machines in the United States; three years later
they would sell more than 2 million units a year, and four years later more than
4 million.”).
140. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,
966–67 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the legislative history of the 1971 copyright
Amendment and 1976 Copyright Act), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
141. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 120 (“Two days
after the Court of Appeals decision, Democrat Denis DeConcini, joined by
Republican Alphonse D’Amato, introduced a senate bill to overturn the decision,
and Republicans Stanford Parris and John Duncan introduced identical bills in
the House.”).
142. See id. at 121 (discussing the lobbying of Congress after the Ninth
Circuit decision).
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The Supreme Court initially heard argument on Sony in
January 1983.143 Months of debate among the Justices left no
consensus, and the Court scheduled the case for reargument for
the next term.144 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the
Ninth Circuit.145 The Court found that the recordings fell under
fair use because they were noncommercial material free to the
public over the airwaves and for private, in-the-home use.146 By
the time the Supreme Court decided Sony, the United States had
over 4 million VCRs in use, and the consideration of practical
implications may have played a role in the Court’s decision.147
The issue of private copies and public performance
resurfaced in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Horne.148 The
defendant owned a video rental store that allowed people to
watch movies in private viewing rooms.149 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals found that this constituted a public performance
because anyone from the public could view the movie by paying,
just like at a movie theater.150
The Ninth Circuit revisited the public performance issue in
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc.151 The defendant’s hotel guests rented movies from
the hotel to watch in the hotel rooms.152 Although Redd Horne was
not controlling precedent, the Ninth Circuit distinguished it because
the nature of a hotel included the possibility of providing movies and
143. Id.
144. See id. at 122–26 (discussing the various memos that the Justices sent
each other regarding their disagreement on the case).
145. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (“[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.”).
146. See id. at 425 (discussing the district court’s conclusion).
147. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 120 (noting
that by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, a large number of
American homes had VCRs).
148. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154, 156 (3d Cir.
1984) (stating the issue).
149. Id. at 157.
150. See id. at 159 (“[A]ny member of the public can view a motion picture
by paying the appropriate fee. The services provided . . . are essentially the
same as a movie theater.”).
151. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
866 F.2d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1989) (identifying the issue).
152. Id.
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entertainment for guests.153 The Ninth Circuit found that watching
movies in the guests’ rooms was not a public performance because
guests “enjoy a substantial degree of privacy” in their hotel rooms.154
The court found no transmit clause violation because the hotel did not
send the transmission from a place different from where guests
received the transmission.155
Shortly after Columbia Pictures, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California ruled on a factually similar case, On
Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.156 On
Command also allowed hotel guests to watch movies in their
rooms.157 Instead of the guest physically renting the cassette tapes,
however, the guests requested the movie from the guestroom’s TV,
and a VCR in a remote location containing the movie played to the
guest’s room.158 Because “a performance occurs where it is received”
and the VCR played from a remote location to hotel guests—a sector
of the public—the district court found a public performance
violation.159
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took up the transmit clause
in NFL v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture.160 PrimeTime rented satellite
dish antennas to customers and made secondary transmissions of TV
network programming to customers in the United States and
Canada.161 Similar to Fortnightly, the defendant used technological
equipment to increase access to network TV.162 In Fortnightly,
153. See id. at 281 (“La Mancha’s operation differs from those in Aveco and
Redd Horne because its ‘nature’ is the providing of living accommodations and
general hotel services, which may incidentally include the rental of videodiscs to
interested guests for viewing in guest rooms.”).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 282 (“[T]he ‘otherwise communicate’ phrase must relate to a
‘process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent.’” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977))).
156. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 777 F.
Supp. 787, 788 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing the facts).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 789–90.
160. See NFL v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing the public performance issue).
161. Id.
162. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968)
(explaining the antenna used to connect customers to TV broadcasts they would
otherwise not be able to receive); NFL, 211 F.3d at 11 (describing PrimeTime’s
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however, the 1909 Copyright Act governed,163 and here, the Second
Circuit heard NFL under the 1976 Copyright Act.164 For the Second
Circuit, “the most logical interpretation” required “each step in the
process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience” to
be a public performance.165 Thus, the Second Circuit found that
PrimeTime violated the NFL’s public performance right.166
Congress responded to NFL and On Command by passing
Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010 (STELA),167
which allows secondary transmissions of broadcasts in certain
circumstances.168 Although STELA creates a public performance
exception, it does not overrule the underlying principles of NFL and
On Command.169
IV. Diverging Case Law Leading Up to the Supreme Court’s Decision
A. Second Circuit
1. Cablevision
Aereo developed its technology around the Second Circuit’s
decision in Cablevision.170 Thus, broadcasters’ first challenge
against Aereo for copyright infringement unsurprisingly failed in
satellites).
163. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 393 (discussing the law at issue in the 1909
Act).
164. See NFL, 211 F.3d at 12 (discussing the Copyright Act of 1976).
165. Id. at 13 (citing David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. See id. (“PrimeTime publicly displayed or performed material in which
the NFL owns the copyright. . . . PrimeTime infringed the NFL’s copyright.”).
167. Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-3333, 124 Stat. 1218 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 111, 122 (2012)).
168. See generally id.
169. See id. (creating a narrow exception for hotel rooms and local markets
without access to broadcasts).
170. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 395
(S.D.N.Y 2012) (“Aereo has made substantial investments of money and human
capital in its system, all in reliance on the assumption that the Second Circuit
meant what it said in Cablevision rather than what it did not say.” (citing
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008))), aff’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d
Cir. 2013).
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the Southern District of New York.171 Broadcasters’ appeal to the
Second Circuit also proved unsuccessful because the Second
Circuit based its decision on Cablevision.172 Several other courts,
however, disagreed with Cablevision and found that Aereo and
FilmOn’s services infringe on copyrights.173
In Cablevision, the plaintiffs challenged Cablevision’s
Remote Storage DVR System (RS-DVR) because it recorded cable
programming and stored the recordings in a remote location.174
The RS-DVR took the single data stream that Cablevision
received from networks and split it into two streams: one stream
went to customers, and the other stream went into a Broadband
Media Router (BMR).175 The BMR buffered the data stream and
reformatted it for a server.176 In the server, the data would first
go to another buffer, and if a customer requested to record a
program, the data would go into a third buffer.177 In the third
buffer, the data would flow onto a hard disk established for that
particular customer’s request and would be available to that
customer when he requested it.178
The issue of public performance centered on the specific
meaning of “transmit,” “performance,” and “to the public.” 179
The court interpreted the transmit clause to mean “a
transmission of a performance is itself a performance,” and
thus, “it is relevant . . . to discern who is ‘capable of receiving’
171. See id. at 401 (finding for Aereo).
172. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
2013) (“The district court . . . conclud[ed] that the plaintiffs were unlikely to
prevail on the merits in light of our prior decision in [Cablevision]. . . . We
agree . . . .”).
173. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC (FilmOn X), No. 13758, 2013 WL 4763414, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (“This Court has carefully
considered the rulings in Cablevision and Aereo II, but it is not bound by
them . . . .”); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144–46 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (determining
that Cablevision was contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent).
174. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536
F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 133 (discussing the transmit clause of the 1976 Copyright Act
(citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4) (2006))).
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the performance being transmitted.” 180 If one takes this
language literally, every potential audience for copyrighted
works is the general public, “[b]ut the transmit clause
obviously
contemplates
the
existence
of
non-public
transmissions.” 181 As such, the court concluded that only the
customer who requests to make the copy could receive the
transmission.182 Therefore, when a user makes and watches a
distinct copy only for that user’s viewing, that transmission
does not violate the transmit clause. 183 The court reasoned that
one person using a distinct copy could limit the potential
audience of that single transmission. 184
In conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that its holding
“does not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid
all copyright liability by . . . associating one unique copy with
each subscriber to the network.” 185 This qualification likely
comes from the court’s fear of the proverbial slippery slope that
could result from a decision allowing services to get around
copyright laws by making inefficient systems. 186 Aereo,
however, did create an inefficient system to get around
copyright liability. 187

180. Id.
181. Id. at 136.
182. See id. at 137 (“[B]ecause the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes
transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we
believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission
is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that
transmission.”).
183. See id. at 139 (“Because each RS-DVR playback transmission is made
to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber,
we conclude that such transmissions are not performances ‘to the public’ . . . .”).
184. See id. at 138 (“[T]he use of a unique copy may limit the potential
audience of a transmission and is therefore relevant . . . .”).
185. Id. at 139. There may be two separate issues of public performance and
making copies. This Note focuses only on the potential public performance that
occurs from the transmission of copyrighted work from a copy of that work.
186. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 710 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir.
2013) (Chin, J., dissenting) (arguing that Aereo took advantage of a loophole in
the copyright law).
187. See id. (discussing Cablevision’s limit).
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2. Aereo I—Southern District of New York
In March 2012, several broadcasting companies filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
against Aereo for copyright infringement.188 Broadcasters quickly
moved for a preliminary injunction against Aereo under the
theory that Aereo publicly performed the plaintiffs’ copyrighted
works.189 The parties first disputed whether Aereo’s system
actually used separate antennas for each customer.190 The court
rejected the conclusions of the plaintiffs’ experts and sided with
Aereo that the antennas function independently to receive
broadcasts.191
Next, the district court engaged in a thorough analysis of
Cablevision to determine its factual similarity to Aereo’s
service.192 Similar to Cablevision, Aereo’s service operates on a
unique copy per user basis.193 Cablevision, however, created
copies from a single stream of data, while Aereo’s system created
copies from separate streams of data.194 This factual difference
strengthened Aereo’s argument for noninfringement based on
Cablevision’s unique copy distinction.195 The plaintiffs tried to
distinguish Cablevision by arguing that Cablevision created a
complete “time-shift” because Cablevision users only viewed the
recorded programs later.196 The district court rejected the

188. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373,
376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction), aff’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 710 F.3d 676 (2d Cir.
2013).
189. See id. (“Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting that
Aereo was directly liable for copyright infringement by publicly performing
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.” (footnote omitted)).
190. See id. at 382 (“[T]his case turns on determining if the analysis in
Cablevision is controlling . . . .”).
191. Id. at 380–81.
192. Id. at 381–84.
193. Id. at 386.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 387–88. This time-shifting discussion comes from the “fixation
requirement” for copyright infringement. For further discussion of the fixation
requirement, see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.02[B][2].
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plaintiffs’ time-shifting argument because the Cablevision court
did not discuss time-shifting as part of its holding.197
The plaintiffs also argued that Aereo’s copies were temporary
buffering copies, which courts found to infringe on copyrights. 198
This argument factually failed because Aereo saved all requested
programming on individual user hard disks even if the user did
not request to record the program for later.199 Last, the Aereo
plaintiffs argued that because anyone who pays for the service
can access it, the public is the potential audience of a
transmission.200
This
argument
failed
Cablevision’s
interpretation that the transmit clause concerns only the
individual transmission from the user’s unique copy.201
After determining Cablevision’s factual similarity, the
district court emphasized the importance of stare decisis,
particularly because Aereo built its technology based on the
Cablevision decision.202 This strong affirmation of Cablevision
may be due to broadcasters’ true desire to not only stop Aereo’s
service, but also overturn Cablevision.203
3. Aereo II—Second Circuit
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction, but they did not appeal the district
197. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court cannot accept this reading of Cablevision . . . .”),
aff’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 710 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
198. See id. at 392 (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument about buffer copies).
199. See id. (“Plaintiffs cannot persuasively analogize the copies stored on
Aereo’s hard disk to ‘buffer’ copies.”).
200. See id. at 392–93 (explaining the plaintiffs’ argument and noting that
this was the same argument the Cablevision plaintiffs offered).
201. See id. (describing the argument as a “non-starter”).
202. See id. at 395 (“Aereo has made substantial investments of money and
human capital in its system, all in reliance on the assumption that the Second
Circuit meant what it said in Cablevision rather than what it did not say.”).
203. See Mike Masnick, Cablevision Realizes It Argued Against Its Own
Interests in Aereo Case; Flips Sides, TECH DIRT (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:51 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131016/02041524891/cablevision-realizes-itargued-against-its-own-interests-aereo-case-flips-sides.shtml (last visited Oct.
31, 2014) (“[B]roadcasters weren’t just focused on Aereo—but rather were
looking to use Aereo to overturn the Cablevision ruling.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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court’s factual finding that Aereo’s antennas operate
independently.204 The Second Circuit began its analysis with the
history of the 1976 Copyright Act, followed by a discussion of
Cablevision.205 The court determined that Cablevision
“establishes four guideposts” for interpreting the transmit clause:
(1) consideration of the potential audience; (2) “private
transmissions . . . should not be aggregated;” (3) private
transmissions can be aggregated if the transmissions come from
the same work; and (4) consideration of any factor limiting the
potential audience of the transmission.206 The court analyzed the
technical details of Aereo’s system and found that it does not
violate the copyright holders’ public performance rights.207
The plaintiffs argued that Cablevision contradicted the
legislative intent of the 1976 Copyright Act.208 The Second Circuit
disagreed and found that if Congress truly intended for all
retransmissions to be actionable, it would not have required a
performance to be public in order to be actionable.209
The dissent saw significant differences between Cablevision
and Aereo’s technologies.210 The dissent found the technical
details of Aereo irrelevant because Aereo’s technology was “a
sham,” purposefully created to evade copyright law.211 Judge
Chin, the dissenting circuit judge in Aereo II, was also the district
judge in Cablevision who granted summary judgment for the
204. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 710 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
2013) (“The District Court resolved that . . . Aereo’s antennas operate
independently. The Plaintiffs do not appeal that factual finding.”).
205. See id. at 684–89 (discussing Cablevision’s analysis and reasoning).
206. Id. at 689.
207. See id. at 689–94 (analyzing Aereo in light of Cablevision).
208. See id. (discussing the legislative intent behind the 1976 Copyright
Act).
209. See id. at 694 (“Congress was careful to note that a performance ‘would
not be actionable as an infringement unless it were done “publicly” . . . .’”). The
court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument to overturn Cablevision on a
procedural technicality because a panel of the Second Circuit cannot overturn a
prior decision unless overruled by the court en banc or the Supreme Court
overrules or casts doubt on a prior decision. Id. at 695.
210. See id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are critical differences
between Cablevision and this case.”).
211. See id. (“[T]he system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over
engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take
advantage of a perceived loophole in the law.”).
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networks, which the Second Circuit overturned.212 Judge Wesley
and Judge Chin also dissented from the court’s denial of a
rehearing en banc.213 Again, they emphasized the effective lack of
distinction between general capture and retransmission of TV
and Aereo’s system.214
4. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.
Just after the Southern District of New York decided Aereo I,
the Second Circuit ruled on WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.,215 which on its
face has facts strikingly similar to Aereo.216 Ivi’s service streamed
live copyrighted programming over the Internet for profit,
allowing users to record, pause, fast-forward, and rewind the
programming.217
Ivi defended that it operated a cable system for purposes of
the Copyright Act, which gives it a compulsory license to
rebroadcast the programming.218 In rebuttal, the plaintiffs argued
that as a cable company, ivi must follow FCC regulations.219 Ivi
212. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (listing then-District Judge Chin as the
judge), rev’d sub nom. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision),
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). William Patry argues that Judge Chin’s “vitriolic,
petulant dissent . . . makes one think he is still resentful over being reversed as
a district judge in Cablevision.” PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 113,
§ 14:28.
213. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 722 F.3d 500, 512 (2d Cir.
2013) (Chin, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (“[T]he panel eviscerates the Copyright Act . . . .”).
215. 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).
216. See id. at 277 (discussing ivi’s service which streams TV over the
Internet). Note that neither the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York nor the Second Circuit went into detail describing ivi’s technology,
and this may be because ivi’s defense kept the court away from the public
performance issue. See id. at 277–78 (discussing the proceedings below, which
do not mention a public performance issue).
217. Id.
218. See id. (“[D]efendants argue that ivi fits within the statutory definition
of a cable system under the Copyright Act.”); 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2012)
(“[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a performance or
display of a work embodied in a primary transmission made by a broadcast
station . . . is permissible . . . .”). For further discussion of § 111 and the Satellite
Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010, see supra note 167.
219. See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[Ivi]

TECHNOLOGY’S LATEST COPYRIGHT WAR

2585

responded that although it fit into the Copyright Act’s definition
of a cable company, it did not meet the FCC’s definition of a cable
company, thus negating a requirement to follow FCC
regulations.220 The Second Circuit did not find the § 111
argument persuasive and affirmed the lower court’s decision that
Congress did not intend to extend the compulsory license of § 111
to Internet retransmissions.221
B. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
Shortly after Aereo I, broadcasting companies challenged a
competing service of Aereo’s, FilmOn.222 FilmOn, however, did
not have the same success as Aereo.223 In Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC,224 the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California analyzed Cablevision,
but dismissed its reading of the transmit clause as one of several
possible interpretations.225 Furthermore, Cablevision “expressly
disagreed” with On Command, a U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California case.226
acknowledg[ed] that ivi does not comply with the ‘rules, regulations, or
authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission’ . . . .”). Recently,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
broadband Internet providers cannot be treated and regulated as common
carriers. See Verizon v. F.C.C., No. 11-1355, 2014 WL 113946, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 14, 2014) (summarizing the court’s finding). While the issue of FCC
regulation of the Internet may have some implications for Aereo and FilmOn, it
is beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion of the FCC’s opinion on
the issue, see supra note 81.
220. See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7415, 2011 WL 1533175, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011) (discussing the defendant’s argument), aff’d, 691 F.3d
275 (2d Cir. 2012).
221. See WPIX, Inc., 691 F.3d at 282 (“[W]e conclude that Congress did not
intend for § 111’s compulsory license to extend to Internet retransmissions.”).
222. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Aereo).
223. See id. (finding that FilmOn’s technology violated copyright law).
224. 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
225. See id. at 1143–45 (discussing Cablevision and the transmit clause).
226. See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (“The Second Circuit’s focus
is also in tension with precedent in the Ninth Circuit.”); supra Part III.D
(discussing On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp.
787 (C.D. Cal. 1991), and other relevant precedent to the issue around
Aereo/FilmOn technology).
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The district court in BarryDriller saw no difference between
transmitting movies to individual hotel rooms and FilmOn’s
retransmissions of broadcasts to users.227 FilmOn essentially
allows users to do something that users could lawfully do
themselves: use an antenna to receive broadcast TV.228 The court
determined, however, that receiving broadcast TV through an
antenna differs when done by a commercial provider.229 The court
reasoned that Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act to
overturn Supreme Court precedent finding a distinction between
what individuals could lawfully do and what commercial
providers could lawfully do.230 Because the court rejected
Cablevision and Aereo, the Central District of California issued a
preliminary injunction for the plaintiffs, enjoining FilmOn from
operating within the Ninth Circuit.231 FilmOn appealed this
decision to the Ninth Circuit, which heard the case at the end of
August 2013 but stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in Aereo.232 After the Supreme Court’s decision, the
parties in BarryDriller agreed to file for dismissal of the case
without prejudice,233 which the Ninth Circuit granted.234
227. See id. (discussing the lack of differences between the technologies at
issue in On Command, Cablevision, and BarryDriller).
228. See id. at 1146 (discussing the fact that FilmOn provides users with
something that they could do themselves with an antenna hooked up to a user’s
TV).
229. See id. (finding no distinction between what individuals can lawfully do
for themselves and what commercial providers can lawfully do for a number of
individuals). Note that this “commercial provider” distinction has roots in the
1909 Act’s “for profit” requirement for public performance violations. See supra
Part III.A (discussing the 1976 Copyright Act’s public performance right and
how it differs from the 1909 Act).
230. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the
jurisprudence before the 1976 Copyright Act and Congress’s intentions in
enacting the Act).
231. See id. at 1151 (ordering a preliminary injunction for the geographic
boundaries of the Ninth Circuit).
232. See Order Vacating Submission, No. 13-55156 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014)
(holding the case in abeyance until the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo). The
Ninth Circuit cited Cablevision in Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, LLC,
723 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). Although Fox Broadcasting Co. did not
concern public performance rights, it may indicate the Ninth Circuit’s
willingness to cite Cablevision for its public performance interpretation.
233. Stipulated Motion to Voluntary Dismiss Appeals Without Prejudice,
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-55156 (9th Cir. July 23,
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C. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Broadcasters also challenged FilmOn in the District of
Columbia. The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the
reasoning in each Cablevision, Aereo, and BarryDriller, but
because none controlled, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia engaged in its own analysis of the transmit clause.235
The transmit clause explains that a transmission can be a public
performance even if the people capable of receiving the
transmission are in the same place at the same time or in
separate places at different times.236 Thus, the court concluded
that by making FilmOn’s services available to any member of the
public, FilmOn violated the broadcasters’ public performance
rights.237
Additionally, the court found that because the individual
antennas all connect to the same server and encoder, they do not
operate independently.238 Because the antennas do not function
independently, FilmOn’s system differs from an individual
setting up his own antenna.239 Therefore, FilmOn’s
retransmissions do not differ from those of cable companies.240
Because the emergence of cable companies encouraged Congress’s
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, FilmOn’s service must
2014).
234. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-55156 (9th Cir.
July 29, 2014).
235. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC (FilmOn X), No. 13758, 2013 WL 4763414, at *5–9 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (discussing the reasoning
of the courts in Cablevision, Aereo, and BarryDriller).
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance . . . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times.”).
237. See FilmOn X, 2013 WL 4763414, at *14 (“By making available
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted performances to any member of the public who accesses
the FilmOn X service, FilmOn X performs the copyrighted work publicly . . . .”).
238. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York made
the opposite factual determination regarding Aereo. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding Aereo’s
antennas operate independently), aff’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.
(Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
239. FilmOn X, 2013 WL 4763414, at *14.
240. Id.
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infringe on broadcasters’ copyrights.241 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia did not just issue an injunction for
the geographic area of the D.C. Circuit but issued a nationwide
injunction, excluding the Second Circuit geographic area.242
D. U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Three months after the Second Circuit’s ruling in Aereo,
Hearst Stations filed a copyright infringement claim against
Aereo in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.243 Yet another federal court faced the issue of
whether broadcast TV received through individual antennas,
saved to hard disks, and streamed to individual users over the
Internet violated the transmit clause.244 The court denied
Hearst’s preliminary injunction motion because it found the
plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits.245
The district court noted that the Second Circuit was the only
court of appeals to date to deal with the issue.246 Thus, the
Second Circuit holding persuaded the court, but it nevertheless
based its reasoning on a reading of the transmit clause as a
whole.247 The transmit clause’s definition of performance
indicated to the court that if one transmits the underlying work
from its original creator to the ultimate consumer, there is no
violation of the transmit clause.248 The legislative history of the
241. See id. (noting that cable TV was the “primary motivation for the 1976
Act’s enactment”).
242. See id. at *18 (“[T]he Court will grant Plaintiffs’ request for nationwide
relief except as to the Second Circuit, where Aereo II is the binding precedent.”).
243. See Complaint, Hearst Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 2013 WL 5604284
(D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2013) (No. 13-11649) (showing the filing date was July 9,
2013).
244. See Hearst Stations, Inc., 2013 WL 5604284, at *4 (“The most hotly
contested issue is whether Aereo infringes WCVB’s exclusive right to transmit
its work to the public.”).
245. Id. at *9.
246. See id. at *5 (“The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit
court to address this issue to date . . . .”).
247. See id. at *6 (discussing Aereo’s argument about the transmit clause).
248. See id. (“Aereo’s interpretation is a better reading of the statute
because the ‘canon against surplusage’ requires this Court to give meaning to
every statutory term if possible.”).
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Act further supported this interpretation because it “explains
that the process of communicating a copyrighted work from its
original creator to the ultimate consumer may involve several
‘performances’” but only public ones violate the Act.249
E. U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
Based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari for
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., the U.S. District Court
for the District of Utah stayed a case against Aereo pending the
Supreme Court’s decision.250 Despite Aereo’s success with other
courts, the District of Utah court issued a stay with a preliminary
injunction against Aereo.251 First looking at the plain language of
the 1976 Copyright Act, the court found that Aereo publicly
performs copyrighted material by transmitting the TV broadcasts
to Aereo’s paying customers.252 Considering the congressional
intent of the 1976 Act, the court found Aereo’s service to be
“indistinguishable from a cable company” and thus, that it
infringed broadcasters’ public performance rights.253 Last, the
court rejected Cablevision’s interpretation of the transmit clause
and factually distinguished Cablevision because Cablevision’s
data stream originated from a licensed broadcast while “no part
of Aereo’s system is authorized.”254 The district court’s issuance of
a preliminary injunction in the Tenth Circuit became the first
area in the country where Aereo could not operate.255

249. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976)).
250. See Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13CV910DAK,
2014 WL 642828, at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2014) (issuing Aereo’s motion to stay).
251. See id. at *10 (granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction against
Aereo).
252. See id. at *4 (applying the plain language of the Copyright Act to
Aereo’s service).
253. Id. at *5.
254. Id. at *7.
255. See id. at *10 (discussing geographic limits of the preliminary
injunction).
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V. The Problem with Public Performance Rights

The basic question for Aereo and FilmOn was whether
capturing a broadcast signal over the airwaves, converting that
signal, and transmitting it over the Internet is a public
performance.256 Based on an interpretation of the transmit clause
and a consideration of the congressional intent behind the 1976
Copyright Act, Aereo and FilmOn infringe broadcasters’ public
performance rights. Although the Supreme Court’s decision
regarding Aereo came to the same conclusion, it did not discuss
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in its decision. Despite the Second
Circuit’s finding of noninfringement for Aereo, under the Second
Circuit’s analysis, FilmOn infringes broadcasters’ public
performance rights. The small distinction yet potential different
outcomes for the two technologies demonstrates the fine,
sometimes unreasonable lines that copyright law has evolved to
dictate. The differing result for Aereo and FilmOn under the
Second Circuit’s framework highlights the need for courts and
lawmakers to reconsider the purpose of copyright law in the
United States.
A. Broadcast TV over the Internet Violates Public Performance
Rights
1. Interpreting the Transmit Clause
a. Scholars’ Interpretations
Professor David Nimmer, whom courts commonly cite as the
copyright authority, provided the Cablevision interpretation of
the transmit clause.257 Nimmer argues that playing one copy
repeatedly to members of the public is a public performance.258
256. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amer. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, No. 13461 (Oct. 11, 2013) (describing the issue), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 2014).
257. See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 688
(2d Cir. 2013) (discussing Nimmer’s interpretation of the transmit clause);
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121,
127 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Nimmer for defining when a copy is produced).
258. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.14[C][3] (“Upon reflection, it
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Nimmer draws this conclusion based on Congress’s inclusion of
the phrase “at different times” in the definition of publicly.259
Thus, according to Nimmer, the “at different times” phrase only
comes into consideration for defining a public performance when
different members of the public perform the same copy of a work
at different times.260
William Patry, a major copyright treatise author and senior
copyright counsel at Google,261 argues that a performance
requires a “‘real time’ transmission,” where the viewer or listener
receives the performance live.262 To be a public performance via
transmission, it must be a real-time transmission; if it is not
transmitted in real-time, then it is not a public performance, and
enters the realm of the exclusive-distribution right.263 For Patry,
the meaning of a public place also limits public performance.264 A
public place is one that the public has access to despite any
conditions to entry, such as an admissions fee.265 A transmission
to a nonpublic place can be a public performance if transmitted to
anyone desiring to receive the transmission through
communications media.266 Patry contends that the public
performance right is not an open-ended right of ultimate control

would seem that what must have been intended was that if the same copy (or
phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different
members of the public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a ‘public’
performance.”).
259. See id. (“But the above-quoted ‘at different times’ phrase in the
definition of what constitutes a public performance casts some doubt upon this
conclusion.”).
260. See id. (“It is only when the same copy of a given work gives rise to
numerous performances by different members of the public that such
performance . . . will be regarded as a public performance, because the public at
large receives performances ‘at different times,’ all emanating from the same
copy.”).
261. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at xiii (“I serve as Senior
Copyright Counsel to Google . . . .”).
262. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 113, § 14:21.
263. See id. (“Where there is no such separate real time performance (as
with instantaneous transmission), only the distribution right is implicated.”).
264. See id. §§ 14:26–28 (discussing public places under the public
performance right).
265. Id. § 14:26.
266. See id. § 14:28 (discussing the second prong of the “publicly” definition).
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because the right allows copyright holders to control “what
consumers listen to” but not where consumers listen to it.267
Judge Daniel Brenner argues that public performance rights
on the Internet do not extend as far as for other mediums.268 To
determine whether a specific piece of work is publicly performed
on the Internet, Judge Brenner suggests a “substitution” and
“substantiality” test.269 The first criterion, substitution, asks
where the transmission originated from to determine if it
substitutes a prior public performance.270 If the transmission
originates from a prior public performance, then presumably, the
original public performance was properly licensed, and thus the
Internet transmission is “a performance covered by the initial
license.”271 For broadcast TV transmitted over the Internet, this
substitution test would permit the transmission without
additional licensing fees because the broadcast is free over the
airwaves.272 Judge Brenner admitted that the online
transmission is “a separate, subsequent performance,” but argued
that it made little sense to require viewers or distributors to pay
additional fees on top of the ones already paid.273
The second criterion of Judge Brenner’s test asks whether
the performance reaches or anticipates reaching a substantial
enough audience to be considered public.274 Judge Brenner argues
267. Id.
268. See Daniel Brenner, “Gently Down the Stream”: When Is an Online
Performance Public Under Copyright?, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1167, 1168
(2013) (“This Article concludes that the language of the Copyright Act supports
a limited online public performance right.”).
269. See id. at 1193–98 (explaining the two criterions for public performance
under the author’s interpretation of the public performance right).
270. See id. at 1193 (“The inquiry would be two-fold: does the transmission
‘substitute’ for an already likely compensated public performance, or does it
originate a performance that has not yet occurred and been paid for?”). Brenner
cited Nimmer for the basic idea of substitution for determining whether a
transmission is a public performance under the public performance clause. See
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.14[C][3].
271. Brenner, supra note 268, at 1193.
272. See id. at 1194–95 (“For the major broadcast networks whose
programming is free to watch . . . over the air, making content available online
allows these networks to extend their audiences . . . .”).
273. Id. at 1194.
274. See id. at 1198 (“In short, public performance requires either a
measurable audience or one that is predicted to be substantial.”).
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that the transmit clause’s language requiring that “the public
capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it”275 supports
his interpretation.276 In light of the two elements for Judge
Brenner’s interpretation of the transmit clause, broadcast TV via
the Internet does not violate the public performance right so long
as the online programming substitutes the broadcast over the
airwaves or cablecast version.277 Based on Nimmer, Patry, and
Judge Brenner’s interpretations of the transmit clause, they
would likely support a finding of no public performance right
infringement for Aereo and FilmOn.278
b. Applying a Different Interpretation
Although one can interpret the transmit clause in several
ways, a thorough analysis and application of the transmit clause
demonstrates that Nimmer and Patry are not necessarily correct.
The analysis begins with whether Aereo and FilmOn perform
broadcast TV. When the user watches broadcast TV on Aereo or
FilmOn, there is a performance because the device “shows its
images in any sequence” and “make[s] the sounds accompanying
it audible.”279 Under the 1976 Copyright Act’s definition, it is
irrelevant how the performance occurs, so long as the
performance does in fact occur.280
The more complex and crucial question is whether the
performance is public. One definition of public is a performance
that occurs “at a place open to the public.”281 Aereo and FilmOn
275. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
276. See Brenner, supra note 268, at 1198 (“This interpretation of the
Transmit Clause . . . gains support by the words of that Clause used to define
‘publicly.’”).
277. See id. at 1202–03 (“Where viewing the programming online is a
substitute for the linear broadcast or cablecast version, the linear performance
license should cover the online viewing.”).
278. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.14[C][3] (discussing a narrow
interpretation of the transmit clause); PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
113, § 14:28 (discussing the limits of the transmit clause); Brenner, supra note
268, at 1198 (interpreting the transmit clause).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
280. See id. (“[B]y means of any device or process . . . .”).
281. Id.
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users presumably watch the broadcasts at home or another
private area because Aereo and FilmOn advertise their services
for use on personal devices.282 Another definition of public is “any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”283
Because Aereo and FilmOn anticipate private use, they do not
meet this second definition of public either.284
The next definition of “to the public” is the transmit clause.285
The first requirement of the transmit clause is for a performance
to be “transmit[ed] or otherwise communicate[d].”286 Aereo and
FilmOn
communicate
the
performance—the
broadcast
programming—to users.287 Thus, Aereo and FilmOn meet the
first requirement of the transmit clause.
The second part of the transmit clause considers whether the
“public” is capable of receiving the performance.288 Both Aereo
and FilmOn offer their services to a substantial number of
persons.289 Users can watch the underlying performance
communicated at the same time or at different times.290
Therefore, Aereo and FilmOn’s communication of the
broadcasters’ performance is to “a substantial number of persons
outside the normal circle of the family”—the public.291 As such, it
282. See, e.g., Supported Devices, AEREO, http://aereo.com/devices (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014) (listing devices one can use) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
283. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
284. See supra Part II.B (describing the user experience, which emphasizes
private use).
285. See id. (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to
transmit . . . .”).
286. Id.
287. See supra Part II.A (explaining what Aereo does).
288. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[M]embers of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in . . . separate places and at the same time or
at different times.”).
289. See Matthew Flamm, Web-TV Startup Aereo Bags $34M in Funding,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:19 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.
com/article/20140108/TECHNOLOGY/140109903/web-tv-startup-aereo-bags-34
m-in-funding (last updated Jan. 10, 2014, 7:16 PM) (last visited Oct. 31, 2014)
(reporting that “Aereo does not divulge how many subscribers it has” but Aereo
operates in ten markets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
290. See supra Part II.B (describing how Aereo works).
291. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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fits the definition of public performance under the transmit
clause. Because Aereo and FilmOn publicly perform under the
transmit clause, they violate broadcasters’ public performance
rights.
2. The Problems with the Second Circuit’s Interpretation of the
Transmit Clause
The reading of the transmit clause offered here directly
contradicts the Second Circuit’s interpretation.292 Although the
Supreme Court’s decision did not discuss the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in Aereo II, discussion of the Second Circuit’s reasoning
is illustrative.293 The Second Circuit found that the transmit
clause does not consider the underlying performance—the
broadcast programming—but instead contemplates the individual
transmissions from the copies on Aereo’s hard drives.294 The
Second Circuit argued that because the transmit clause says
“capable of receiving the performance,” instead of “capable of
receiving the transmission,” it means whomever is capable of
receiving the specific transmission and not the underlying
work.295 This reading of the transmit clause, however, is
conclusory. The fact that the transmit clause says “capable of
receiving the performance” indicates that the Act concerns the
underlying performance and not the individual transmission.296
The Second Circuit cites to Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.297
in support of its interpretation of the transmit clause, but the
Supreme Court heard Buck under the 1909 Copyright Act.298

292. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision),
536 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the transmit clause considers who
is capable of receiving the particular copy of the performance).
293. See generally Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(failing to discuss the Second Circuit’s reasoning).
294. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 695 (2d Cir.
2013) (discussing Aereo’s private performances).
295. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134 (determining the meaning of the
transmit clause).
296. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
297. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
298. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134 (using a “cf.” signal citing to Buck).
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Thus, the Second Circuit’s reading of the transmit clause is a
conclusory statement supported by outdated law.299
Additionally, the Second Circuit focuses too heavily on the
minute technical details of Aereo without considering its broad
functionality.300 Congress intended to allow broadcasters to
capture the profits that cable companies received through
retransmission by requiring cable and satellite companies to pay
retransmission fees to broadcasters.301 Because Congress could
not predict future technologies, Congress purposely used vague
terms to ensure that the Act would capture similar concerns
about broadcasters losing profit streams because of free airwave
broadcasting.302 Aereo and FilmOn specifically fall into the
scenario that Congress intended to prevent under the Copyright
Act.303 Thus, courts must consider how Aereo’s system as a whole
functions, and Aereo functions to retransmit broadcast TV, like a
cable company.
Considering other similar issues in copyright law
demonstrates the importance of considering functionality.
Professor Jeffrey Malkan described the individual copies per
customer distinction as “a classic distinction without a difference”
and argued that the issue should be resolved by looking at what
the technology accomplishes.304 Malkan drew a comparison to fair
use and course packets.305 In Princeton University Press v.

299. Notably, Patry thinks that the Second Circuit decided both Cablevision
and Aereo correctly. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 113, § 14.28. He
argues that because Aereo created its technology to comply with Cablevision, it
should not be liable. Id.
300. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the
technical details of a particular system and more on its functionality . . . .”).
301. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) (“[A] cable television system is
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers . . . .”).
302. See id. at 64 (“The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . is broad enough to include
all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless communications
media, including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcast as
we know them.”).
303. See supra Part II.A (describing what Aereo and FilmOn do).
304. Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 547 (2010).
305. See id. at 548–49 (discussing the issues of fair use in Princeton Univ.
Press v. Mich. Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
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Michigan Document Services, Inc.,306 the Sixth Circuit found that
when a copy shop photocopied books for course packets, there was
no fair use defense, but if the students copied the books
themselves, they would have a fair use defense.307 Malkan made a
parallel analogy to TV: individual viewers can make their own
copies, but when viewers have someone else do the copying for
them at a profit, copyright holders should receive a share of that
profit.308
Like with course packet copying, Aereo and FilmOn start
with an action that individual users could lawfully do themselves:
capturing TV broadcasts from the airwaves and copying them. 309
Just because Aereo and FilmOn do something that individuals
could lawfully do themselves, however, does not make Aereo and
FilmOn lawful. This idea goes back to the for-profit distinction
under the 1909 Copyright Act.310 The legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act indicates that Congress did not intend to
eliminate the for-profit distinction.311 Thus, one must consider the
profit schemes of the retransmissions in the public performance
analysis. In light of the congressional intent and the comparison
to fair use, the Second Circuit’s analysis incorrectly overlooked
the broad functionality of Aereo.

306. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
307. See id. at 1389 (discussing the difference between a student copying a
book and a copy shop making copies and selling those copies to students).
308. See Malkan, supra note 304, at 549–50 (discussing the analogy between
copying course packets and copying TV programs).
309. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the fact
that FilmOn provides users with something that they could do themselves with
an antenna hooked up to a user’s TV); supra Part II.A (explaining how Aereo
captures broadcast airwaves).
310. See Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (requiring the public
performance be “for profit” to be an infringement), repealed and superseded by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2012)).
311. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (describing the “for profit”
limitation).
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B. FilmOn’s Differences Make It Less Likely to Be Lawful
The Supreme Court’s decision on Aereo prevents FilmOn
from lawfully operating as well.312 Even, under the Second
Circuit’s interpretation of the transmit clause, FilmOn would not
have received the same treatment as Aereo because FilmOn did
not significantly limit who was capable of receiving its
transmission.313 The first three guideposts that the Second
Circuit offered fell in FilmOn’s favor, but weighing the
importance of the fourth factor shows FilmOn’s violation of the
transmit clause.314 This analysis illustrates the fact that although
two technologies can broadly operate in the same way, copyright
law has the potential to affect them differently.
First, the Second Circuit required considering the individual
transmission.315 Because only one user could access the broadcast
file FilmOn created, FilmOn passed the first factor.316 Second,
although FilmOn transmitted thousands of individual
transmissions from unique broadcast files, the transmissions had
to be considered individually and not collectively because FilmOn

312. See CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7532(NRB), 2014
WL 3702568, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (finding FilmOn in contempt of a
previously issued injunction based on the Supreme Court’s ruling against
Aereo).
313. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir.
2013) (identifying the importance of limitations on the potential audience for
considering whether the transmission is public). For further discussion of the
Second Circuit’s four guidelines for applying the transmit clause, see supra Part
IV.A.3 (discussing Aereo II).
314. See Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 689 (discussing the four guideposts of
Cablevision). The guideposts for applying the transmit clause are
(1) “consider[ing] the potential audience of an individual transmission,”
(2) determining who is capable of receiving the transmission, (3) determining
whether the transmission is generated from the same copy of work, and
(4) considering anything that limits the potential audience of the transmission.
Id.
315. See id. (“[I]f the potential audience of the transmission is only one
subscriber, the transmission is not a public performance . . . .”). This subpart
applies this factor despite Part V.A of this Note arguing that it is incorrect.
316. See supra Part II.A (discussing how FilmOn and Aereo work).
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transmitted the programming from unique copies.317 Thus,
FilmOn met the Second Circuit’s second and third guideposts.318
The fourth factor considered whether the technology limits
the potential audience in any way.319 In Cablevision, the court
found the fact that only one user could access the individual
copies sufficiently limited the potential audience.320 A strict
application of this factor weighed in FilmOn’s favor because only
one user could watch the individual copy.321 But in the context of
place-shifting322 broadcast TV, there should be a greater limiting
factor because broadcast TV over the airwaves limits access to
those within the geographic range of the airwaves.323 The RSDVR in Cablevision did not change the place that users could
receive broadcasts, only the time.324 Thus, requiring more from
place-shifting services fits within the Second Circuit’s transmit
clause guideposts.325 FilmOn did not geographically limit who

317. See Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 689 (“[P]rivate transmissions—that is those
not capable of being received by the public—should not be aggregated.”).
318. See id. (discussing the transmit clause guideposts).
319. See id. (“Fourth and finally, ‘any factor that limits the potential
audience of a transmission is relevant’ to the Transmit Clause analysis.” (citing
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121,
137 (2d Cir. 2008))).
320. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision),
536 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding a sufficient limit on the potential
audience to be a private performance).
321. See supra Part II.A (explaining Aereo and FilmOn’s services).
322. Ted Johnson, Why Slingbox Is Finally Getting the Aereo Treatment,
VARIETY (Mar. 8, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://variety.com/2013/digital/opinion/theslingbox-paradox-broadcasters-dont-object-1200005356/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Place-shifting is the
idea that the technology changes only the place where the user watches the
transmission. See id. (discussing place-shifting). This comes from Sony’s
description of the VCR as “authorized time shifting” in that it changes the time
that the user watches the transmission. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443 (1984) (discussing “time shifting”).
323. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC
(BarryDriller), 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the
natural limits of broadcast TV).
324. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 125 (explaining the time-shifting
capabilities).
325. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir.
2013) (describing any limiting factor on the potential audience as the fourth
guidepost for applying the transmit clause).

2600

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557 (2014)

could access certain broadcast TV like Aereo does.326 Therefore,
FilmOn did not sufficiently limit the potential audience because
it expanded access to those otherwise unable to receive the
broadcasts.327
The Second Circuit did not discuss the comparative
importance of each guidepost, but a sliding scale approach would
be appropriate considering that the court referred to them as
“guideposts.”328 The fourth factor weighs heavily against the rest
because all four guideposts concern limitations on the potential
audience.329 FilmOn argued that it operated to allow users to
access the free broadcast TV that users could already access, but
because FilmOn actually does more, it is distinguishable from
Aereo.330 This difference affects the Second Circuit’s application
of the transmit clause.331 Although the Supreme Court’s Aereo
decision equally affects FilmOn, FilmOn’s lack of geographic
limitations could continue to affect it in future litigation
regarding whether FilmOn operates as a cable system eligible for
compulsory licensing.
C. The Supreme Court’s Aereo Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision determined that Aereo
infringed on the broadcasters’ public performance rights based on
a similar analysis of the congressional intent discussed above.332
326. See supra Part II.C (discussing the differences between Aereo and
FilmOn).
327. See Telephone Interview with Alkiviades David, supra note 55 (saying
that someone on the East Coast could watch West Coast TV).
328. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 689.
329. See id. (explaining the four guideposts).
330. See Amended Counterclaim at 2, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FilmOn X LLC (FilmOn X), 2013 WL 4763414 (D.D.C. June 27, 2013) (No. 13758) (“[E]nabling consumers to create and access . . . the same free-to-air
broadcast programming they would have been able to access freely with a
traditional ‘rabbit ears’ antenna . . . .”).
331. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir.
2013) (analyzing the transmit clause).
332. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504–10 (2014)
(analyzing whether Aereo’s system performs under the Copyright Act); see also
supra Part II.C (discussing the congressional intent behind the 1976 Copyright
Act).
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The Supreme Court’s decision on Aereo broke down the public
performance issue into whether Aereo performs broadcast TV,
and if so, whether Aereo publicly performs broadcast TV.333 The
Supreme Court supported its finding that Aereo performs
broadcast TV with three indicators of Congressional intent. First,
the text of the 1976 Copyright Act defines “perform” as “to show
its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying
it audible,” which Aereo does when subscribers request to watch a
broadcast program.334 Second, Congress added the transmit
clause in the 1976 Copyright Act to ensure that cable systems
were considered public performers.335 Third, Congress included a
detailed compulsory licensing scheme in the Act for cable systems
to pay retransmission fees to broadcasters.336 The Court reasoned
that Congress would not have constructed the statute as such if it
did not intend for a service like Aereo to perform under the Act.337
In determining whether Aereo performs publicly, the Court
decided that Aereo’s performance does not differ from that of a
cable system’s performance of broadcast TV.338 Based on the
language of the transmit clause, the Court reasoned that because
Aereo transmits the same pictures and sounds to a large number
of people, it is irrelevant whether Aereo transmits the broadcast
TV from the same copy or separate copies.339 This reasoning
effectively abrogates Cablevision without even mentioning
Cablevision.340
The Court carefully limited its ruling to Aereo and systems
like Aereo that effectively operate as cable systems.341 If the
receivers of a performance own the underlying work, they do not

333. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
334. Id. at 2504.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2506.
337. Id. at 2506–07.
338. Id. at 2508.
339. See id. (citing the following language in the transmit clause: “whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive
it . . . at the same time or at different times” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
340. See generally id. (lacking any mention of Cablevision); see also Part
IV.A.1 (discussing Cablevision’s holding).
341. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510 (2014).
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infringe public performance rights.342 Therefore, the decision’s
narrow focus allays concerns that cloud computing would be
affected by the decision.343
D. The Underlying Public Policy of Copyright Requires Aereo to
Survive
New technologies will always seek to capture new markets or
existing markets in new ways.344 These changes challenge
copyright law to adapt to the technological innovation that it
inspires.345 Because technological changes force copyright law to
constantly grow and evolve, it is imperative that copyright law
stick to its fundamental prerogatives instead of stringently
adhering to statutes. When TV originated, courts looked to
analogies from other technological revolutions.346 Combining the
underlying theories of copyright law and a historical framework
shows that Aereo should not be considered a copyright infringer
despite the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Professor Paul Goldstein highlights the central copyright
question that issues like Aereo and FilmOn provoke: What is
copyright law supposed to do?347 On one end of the spectrum,
copyright law can “expand to encompass every new dissemination
of technology that emerges so that authors and publishers can
342. Id. at 2511.
343. See id. (noting that this case does not present an issue about cloud
computing and thus, the case does not affect such technology). Note that the
Supreme Court only decided the issue of whether Aereo performs publicly and
directly violates the public performance right. Id. at 2503. Issues raised by the
broadcasters’ complaint in the District Court yet to be decided include secondary
liability for public performance rights, as well as direct and secondary liability
for reproduction rights. Complaint at 28–38, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12CV01540).
344. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 36–37 (discussing
innovation).
345. See id. (discussing how innovation and copyright must work together).
346. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 161–62
(1975) (making a comparison to the public performance issues with broadcast
TV and cable TV).
347. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.13 (3d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT] (discussing the “fundamental
philosophical debate” that “present[s] a stark choice for lawmakers”).
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capture every element of their work’s value in the
marketplace.”348 At the other end, copyright law could permit
consumers free access to copyrighted works to the extent that
“authors and publishers can show that, deprived of payment, they
have no incentive to create and publish new works.”349
Copyrights do not create a monopoly for the protected
work.350 Even the exclusive rights of copyright holders have
exceptions to avoid rigid application of rules that would go
against fundamental copyright principles.351 Copyright should
encourage innovation and “the widest possible production and
dissemination of literary and artistic works.”352 The public and
the creators have two competing interests.353 The public should
have broad availability of works, and the creator needs a
financial motivation to create and share the work.354
Broadcasters’ copyright interests slightly differ from traditional
artists, like authors, because broadcasters do not profit directly
from consumers.355 Although today broadcasters receive more
revenue from cable companies in retransmission fees, the bulk of
broadcasters’ revenue still comes from advertising.356 Therefore,
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 68, § 8.01 (“[C]opyright does not
confer an absolute monopoly in the patent sense.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“[P]rotection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work.”).
351. See notes 66–75 and accompanying text (discussing fair use and first
sale doctrines).
352. GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 347, § 1.14.
353. See id. (discussing congressional considerations when amending
copyright law).
354. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music and other arts.”).
355. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394, 411
(1974) (comparing copyright of TV and books); supra notes 106–10 and
accompanying text (discussing Teleprompter’s analysis of differences in
copyright law for TV and books).
356. See Brian Stelter, Broadcasters Battling for Cable Fees, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/business/media/29cable.
html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw&_r=0 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2014) (reporting that broadcasters only receive five percent of
their revenue from cable retransmission fees) (on file with the Washington and
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broadcast TV that reaches more people would be able to draw in
more advertising revenue, so technologies like Aereo and FilmOn
that increase the audience of broadcast TV should actually help
broadcasters receive more advertising revenue. Copyright law in
the United States has evolved to benefit creators too much, and
thus, one must consider who has the greater policy stance in
determining public performance rights.357
Beyond considering the purpose of copyright law, courts have
a history of considering public performance issues. Radio and
public performance issues collided in two ways. First, when radio
broadcasters began broadcasting prerecorded songs instead of
live music, and second, when public business played radios in
their establishments.358 Enforcing public performance rights cost
too much for individual authors and composers to enforce, so
several came together to form the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).359 ASCAP tried to
operate as a monopoly to ensure it received the maximum
royalties.360 In this endeavor, it fought radio broadcasters to have
radio broadcasts of songs deemed public performances.361 When
ASCAP tried to increase fees however, the radio broadcasters
started buying their own music licenses and refused to play
ASCAP’s licensed music.362 This resulted in no one using
ASCAP’s licenses, and ASCAP had to return to the negotiating
table with broadcasters at lower prices.363
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,364 the Court
compared cable TV and radio.365 The defendant, Aiken, owned a
fast food restaurant and played the radio in his restaurant on

Lee Law Review).
357. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at xv (discussing the
“unjustified expansion of our copyright laws”).
358. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 57–59
(discussing the battles of radio and public performance rights).
359. Id. at 54–55.
360. Id. at 57.
361. Id. at 57–58.
362. Id. at 59.
363. Id. at 59–60.
364. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
365. Id. at 161.
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four ceiling-mounted speakers.366 The Court considered the
practical implications of its ruling because so many business
establishments openly played the radio.367 Thus, the Court’s
analysis construed the 1909 Act in accordance with “[t]he limited
scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly” to find no
copyright infringement.368
Radio continued to struggle with royalty fees under the 1995
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).369
Radio broadcasters finally won their struggle gaining an
exemption to public performance when “Congress agreed that
radio performance of sound recordings acted as a valuable form of
free advertising.”370 Radio broadcasters pay royalties to
composers but the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) still tries to claim that radio broadcasters should be
paying record companies royalties as well.371
Radio exemplifies finding a copyright exception to further
both the public and private interests. The actual artists and
composers creating the music benefit from the exposure radio
provides.372 Radio stations gain by not having to pay exorbitant
fees that they could not afford.373 The public gains by being able
to hear free music over the radio airwaves.374 If broadcasters,
Aereo, and FilmOn could find compromise now, they would be
able to avoid the decades of legal battles that radio saw. An
unfavorable Supreme Court challenge for broadcasters could open
the door to compromise similar to how broadcasters were more
willing to work with DVR companies after Cablevision.375
366. Id. at 152.
367. Id. at 162.
368. Id. at 156.
369. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (2012); see also PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 212, § 14:87 (discussing radio retransmissions).
370. See id. (discussing the 1995 DPRA).
371. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 95–96 (discussing how RIAA
uses “piracy” to describe radio broadcasters).
372. See id. at 96 (“[R]adio play is a valuable promotional tool.”).
373. See GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 20, at 57 (discussing
the fee battles between ASCAP and radio broadcasters).
374. See PATRY, MORAL PANICS, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing the most
recent radio battle).
375. Sharma, Ramachandran & Clark, supra note 4.
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History and precedent demonstrate the importance of
considering the practical implications of technology when
determining copyright infringement. Aereo and FilmOn increase
access to the broadcasters’ viewership.376 People who might not
otherwise tune in on an antenna, cable, or satellite may watch
the broadcast TV offered through Aereo and FilmOn.
Broadcasters argue that although Aereo and FilmOn may be
increasing viewership, it does not actually benefit broadcasters
because viewership on Aereo and FilmOn is not incorporated into
the numbers that advertisers use.377 But Aereo and FilmOn could
easily track viewership for advertisers to consider.378 When new
technology emerges, other technologies and processes must adapt.
Senator John McCain introduced a bill in Congress that
would provide a framework for technologies such as Aereo to
operate, and Congress should seriously consider such a bill.379
Passing a bill like the proposed Television Consumer Freedom
Act would allow for a return to the fundamentals of copyright law
and support the public interest in TV programming.
VI. Conclusion
Congress and courts have expanded copyright law to an
extent that it no longer truly captures the essence of copyright.380
Based on a hard reading of the 1976 Copyright Act, Aereo and
376. See supra Part II (discussing Aereo’s technology, which allows users to
receive broadcast TV even if they would normally be unable to receive the
broadcast TV with “rabbit ears”).
377. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, No. 13-461
(Oct. 11, 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014).
378. See Tracking & Statistics, FILMON, http://corp.filmon.com/#
tracking_statistics (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (offering tracking for its partners)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
379. See Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, S. 912, 113th Cong.
(2013) (proposing a legal framework “allow[ing] multichannel video
programming distributors to provide video programming to subscribers on an a
la carte basis”).
380. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 840 (2010) (“The
goal [of the Copyright Clause] was the enhancement of the quantity and quality
of literary and artistic works. . . . [T]his incentive was merely the means to the
end of enriching the intellectual, cultural and artistic wealth of society.”).
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FilmOn infringe on broadcasters’ exclusive public performance
rights, but Aereo and FilmOn simply tried to be innovative based
on what they believed the law to be. This technological innovation
is exactly what copyright law should encourage, not prohibit. To
stay true to copyright principles, Aereo should not be considered
a copyright infringer because it likely could benefit, not hurt
broadcasters and it encourages innovation. Technology will
continue to evolve and after the Supreme Court’s ruling on Aereo,
other companies quickly filled Aereo’s space in the market.381 As
Aereo continues to fight its legal battle in the courts, other
technologies will quickly move to capture the market it leaves
behind, and broadcasters may move to squash other new
technologies that encroach on the market broadcasters have come
to expect from the law.

381. See Michael Rogeau, New York Broadcaster Picks Up Where Aereo Left
Off with New Tablet TV Service, TECHRADAR (Aug. 31, 2014),
http://www.techradar.com/news/television/new-york-broadcaster-picks-up-whereaereo-left-off-with-new-tablet-tv-service-1263384 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014)
(describing a company that rents antennas to customers, which then broadcasts
live TV to tablets within one-hundred feet) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Sonali Basak & Alex Barinka, TiVo Offers DVR to Cable-Free
Viewers After Aereo Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2014, 4:12 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-25/tivo-offers-dvr-device-to-viewers-with
out-cable-satellite-tv.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (describing TiVo’s new
device that can record over-the-air content from broadcast networks by
capturing them through an antenna in the device) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

